As the French army falls back toward Paris in the face of an overwhelming German advance, the Minister of War, Adolphe Messimy, decides that the ineffective General Victor-Constant Michel must be replaced as Military Governor of Paris. At the same time, a majority of the newly-formed coalition government decide that Messimy must himself be replaced. Barbara Tuchman, in The Guns of August, picks up the story:
Michel stormed when asked by Messimy to resign, protested loudly and angrily and obstinately refused to go. Becoming equally excited, Messimy shouted at Michel that if he persisted in his refusal he would leave the room, not for his own office at the Invalides, but for the military prison of Cherche-Midi under guard. As their cries resounded from the room Viviani fortuitously arrived, calmed the disputants, and eventually persuaded Michel to give way.
Hardly was the official decree appointing Gallieni “Military Governor and Commandant of the Armies of Paris” signed next day when it became Messimy’s turn to storm when asked for his resignation by Poincaré and Viviani. “I refuse to yield my post to Millerand, I refuse to do you the pleasure of resigning, I refuse to become a Minister without Portfolio.” If they wanted to get rid of him after the “crushing labor” he had sustained in the last month, then the whole government would have to resign, and in that case, he said, “I have an officer’s rank in the Army and a Mobilization order in my pocket. I shall go to the front.” No persuasion availed. The government was forced to resign and was reconstituted next day. Millerand, Delcassé, Briand, Alexandre Ribot, and two new socialist ministers replaced five former members, including Messimy. He departed as a major to join Dubail’s army and to serve at the front until 1918, rising to general of division.
In Tuchman’s account, refusal to obey orders was rampant in the French army, from the Minister of War down to the lowliest private, but was frequently found as well in the British and Russian armies. As in Tolstoy’s version of Napoleon’s 1812 invasion of Russia, Tuchman tells of continual miscommunication that, added to chronic failures of military discipline, leaves one persistent impression of the opening weeks of World War I, on all fronts: utter confusion.