Economics is to study the law of human economic activities, that is, the law of value creation, transformation and realization. In economics, it is difficult to falsify false data, because most of the data used in the investigation are to be disclosed, and many indicators are intrinsically linked. It’s easy to find out.
Humanities refers to the science which takes the social existence of human beings as the research object and aims at revealing the essence and development law of human society.For economics, it is related to people’s psychological activities, but economics needs strong mathematical ability to create mathematical models. So I think it’s really scientific.
Logic generally refers to the laws and rules of thinking and is also important in our daily lives. In class, we know two arguments, deductive and inductive.
All odd numbers are integers.
All even numbers are integers.
Therefore, all odd numbers are even numbers.
This is an example in the text, I think it is too hasty to use inductive.
Socrates
Then the result of our reasoning, Meno, is found to be that virtue comes to us by a divine dispensation, when it does come. But the certainty of this we shall only know when, before asking in what way virtue comes to mankind, we set about inquiring what virtue is, in and
by itself. It is time now for me to go my way, but do you persuade our friend Anytus of that whereof you are now yourself persuaded, so as to put him in a gentler mood; for if you can persuade him, you will do a good turn to the people of Athens also.
In the part 5 of Plato’s Meno, Socrates and Meno concluded the discussion of the virtues and got the answer, the virtual comes to us by a divine dispensation, when it does come. I think this answer is Socrates in the perfunctory Meno, because it has been discussed for a long time whether the virtues have been taught by the teacher. Suddenly, it is directly determined that virtue is a talent.
In the part 3 and part 4 of Plato’s Meno, Socrates and Meno are discussing whether virtue is a kind of knowledge.
Socrates
So you see we have made short work of this question—if virtue belongs to one class of things it is teachable, and if to another, it is not.（29）
In this part, Socrates gives Meno a vague answer, and does not directly give a judgment, whether virtue is a kind of knowledge.
In this part of the story, Meno and Socrates further discuss what is virtue. Meno thinks Socrates is like the flat torpedo sea-fish, but Socrates still uses a way to ask a slave to Meno to prove that he is right.
Socrates
So that he who does not know about any matters, whatever they be, may have true opinions on such matters, about which he knows nothing?
Meno
Apparently.
Socrates
And at this moment those opinions have just been stirred up in him, like a dream; but if he were repeatedly asked these same questions in a variety of forms, you know he will have in the end as exact an understanding of them as anyone.
Meno
So it seems.
In Socrates’ view, anyone has a real opinion of one thing, even though they may not understand it.
In the first part of ‘Meno’, I saw Socrates and Meno discussing what virtue is. Meno gave some examples to Socrates. Socrates did not directly tell Meno what it was, but instead guided Meno by asking questions (it is possible that Socrates does not know what virtue is.)
Socrates
Is it only in the case of virtue, do you think, Meno, that one can say there is one kind
belonging to a man, another to a woman, and so on with the rest, or is it just the same,
too, in the case of health and size and strength? Do you consider that there is one health
for a man, and another for a woman? Or, wherever we find health, is it of the same
character universally, in a man or in anyone else?
Meno
I think that health is the same, both in man and in woman.
Socrates
Then is it not so with size and strength also? If a woman is strong, she will be strong by
reason of the same form and the same strength; by “the same” I mean that strength does
not differ as strength, whether it be in a man or in a woman. Or do you think there is any
difference?
Meno
I do not.
Socrates
And will virtue, as virtue, differ at all whether it be in a child or in an elderly person, in a
woman or in a man?
Meno
I feel somehow, Socrates, that here we cease to be on the same ground as in those other
cases.
Socrates
Why? Were you not saying that a man’s virtue is to manage a state well, and a woman’s a
house?
Meno
I was.
Socrates
And is it possible to manage a state well, or a house, or anything at all, if you do not
manage it temperately and justly?
Meno
Surely not.
Socrates
Then whoever manages temperately and justly will manage with temperance and justice?
Platoʼs ʻMenoʼ, tr. W.R.M. Lamb • Page 3 of 47
Meno
That must be.
Socrates
Then both the woman and the man require the same qualities of justice and temperance, if
they are to be good.
Meno
Evidently.
Socrates
And what of a child or an old man? Can they ever hope to be good if they are intemperate
and unjust?
Meno
Surely not.
Socrates
Only if they are temperate and just?
Meno
Yes.
Socrates
So all mankind are good in the same way; for they become good when they acquire the
same qualities.
Meno
So it seems.
Socrates
And I presume, if they had not the same virtue, they would not be good in the same way.
Meno
No, indeed.
Not all black and white; the most interesting bits are gray.
