In the first part of ‘Meno’, I saw Socrates and Meno discussing what virtue is. Meno gave some examples to Socrates. Socrates did not directly tell Meno what it was, but instead guided Meno by asking questions (it is possible that Socrates does not know what virtue is.)

Socrates
Is it only in the case of virtue, do you think, Meno, that one can say there is one kind
belonging to a man, another to a woman, and so on with the rest, or is it just the same,
too, in the case of health and size and strength? Do you consider that there is one health
for a man, and another for a woman? Or, wherever we find health, is it of the same
character universally, in a man or in anyone else?
Meno
I think that health is the same, both in man and in woman.
Socrates
Then is it not so with size and strength also? If a woman is strong, she will be strong by
reason of the same form and the same strength; by “the same” I mean that strength does
not differ as strength, whether it be in a man or in a woman. Or do you think there is any
difference?
Meno
I do not.
Socrates
And will virtue, as virtue, differ at all whether it be in a child or in an elderly person, in a
woman or in a man?
Meno
I feel somehow, Socrates, that here we cease to be on the same ground as in those other
cases.
Socrates
Why? Were you not saying that a man’s virtue is to manage a state well, and a woman’s a
house?
Meno
I was.
Socrates
And is it possible to manage a state well, or a house, or anything at all, if you do not
manage it temperately and justly?
Meno
Surely not.
Socrates
Then whoever manages temperately and justly will manage with temperance and justice?
Platoʼs ʻMenoʼ, tr. W.R.M. Lamb • Page 3 of 47
Meno
That must be.
Socrates
Then both the woman and the man require the same qualities of justice and temperance, if
they are to be good.
Meno
Evidently.
Socrates
And what of a child or an old man? Can they ever hope to be good if they are intemperate
and unjust?
Meno
Surely not.
Socrates
Only if they are temperate and just?
Meno
Yes.
Socrates
So all mankind are good in the same way; for they become good when they acquire the
same qualities.
Meno
So it seems.
Socrates
And I presume, if they had not the same virtue, they would not be good in the same way.
Meno
No, indeed.